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ABSTRACT 
After decennia of research on economic voting, it is now established that the state of the 
economy affects voting behaviour. Nevertheless, this conclusion is the result of a focus on 
predominantly national- level economies and national- level elections. In this paper, we show 
that at a local level as well, mechanisms of accountability linked to the economy are at work. 
The local economic context affected voting behaviour in the 2012 Belgian municipal 
elections, with a stronger increase of unemployment rates in their municipality significantly 
decreasing the probability that voters choose an incumbent party. Additionally, we observe 
that voters are not opportunistically voting for incumbents who lower tax rates. Instead, voters 
seem to be holding local incumbents accountable for local economic conditions. We hence 
conclude that voters care about economic outcomes, not about what specific policies are 
implemented to reach these outcomes. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The financial and economic crisis that hit Europe from 2008 onwards has the potential to 
strongly influence voting behaviour in European democracies. Even though multiparty 
systems and coalition governments in Europe obscure clarity of responsibility (Powell and 
Whitten 1993), previous research has indicated strong economic effects in elections across 
Europe (Duch and Stevenson 2008; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000; Lewis-Beck 2006; van 
der Brug, van der Eijk and Franklin 2007). Furthermore, a general negativity bias among 
voters and in the media leads to the expectation that economic effects are even more 
pronounced in times of crisis (Bloom and Price 1975; Dassonneville and Lewis-Beck 2014a; 
Soroka 2006). 
 
At first sight, these considerations apply to national levels of governance only. At a local 
level, by contrast, one could expect economic factors to be of less importance. The strong 
results of previous research on economic voting across countries and contexts, however, lead 
to the expectation that vote choices at a local level can also be affected by the economy. 
While scholars in the field of economic voting have predominantly focused on national 
electoral contexts, some authors have already investigated the economic vote in subnational 
contexts (Auberger and Dubois 2011; Berry and Howell 2007; Cutler 2002; Jérôme and 
Jérôme-Speziari 2005; Johnston and Pattie 2001). Most of these studies, however, either focus 
on how national economic conditions affect the local vote or on how the local economic 
context affects voting in national elections. The limited number of studies that sheds light on 
how local economic conditions affect voting in local elections, furthermore, is mostly 
focussing on the aggregate level i.e. investigating shifts in the incumbent’s vote share (Boyne 
et al. 2009; Martins and Veiga 2013; Sakurai and Menezes-Filho 2008). While insightful, 
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such an approach is also subject to ecological fallacy, which is why these findings have to be 
complemented with insights from individual-level studies (Oliver and Ha 2007).  
 
In this paper, we aim to shed light on this link between local economic conditions and the 
individual vote choice in local elections. We do so by means of an analysis of individual 
voting behaviour in the Belgian municipal elections of October 2012. We make use of the 
data of the PartiRep exit poll 2012, containing data on over 4,500 voters in 40 Belgian 
municipalities. The Belgian electoral context can be considered a hard test for investigating 
the presence of economic voting, as the multilevel institutional Belgian political context 
mutes clarity of responsibility for the economy. Additionally, the second-order traits of local 
elections in Belgium and the fact that the 2012 elections in particular were framed as a 
referendum on the national incumbent government (Marien, Dassonneville and Hooghe 2015) 
can be thought to have further obfuscated mechanisms of accountability at the local level.  
 
Our focus on the local level, with voters nested in 40 Belgian municipalities, has a number of 
clear advantages. First, lowering the level of analysis to the local level increases the number 
of cases and investigating the economic vote in 40 electoral contexts should result in more 
robust and reliable estimates, compared to analysis of the economic vote in a single (national) 
election. Second, and importantly, as our comparative analysis is embedded in a single nation 
– a lot of the confounding factors (e.g., the electoral system, but also the impact of time) are 
held constant in our analysis (Boulding and Brown 2015). This turn to focusing on a 
subnational level for testing general theories has previously been taken in the literature on 
party competition (Bäck 2003; 2008; Skjaeveland, Serritzlew and Blom-Hansen 2007) and we 
think the voting behaviour literature as well can benefit from testing its theories at subnational 
levels. 
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This paper proceeds as follows. We first elaborate on the specificities of the Belgian electoral 
context before giving an overview of theories of economic voting and economic voting in 
local elections. Next, we present the data used for testing our hypotheses, the PartiRep exit 
poll 2012. After introducing the methods used, we describe the results and end with a 
discussion on the implications of our findings. 
 
2. Belgian local elections 
 
We investigate how the local economy affects voting behaviour in local elections by means of 
a focus on the Belgian 2012 municipal elections. Despite the institutional complexity of the 
political context, previous research has already given indications of some degree of economic 
voting in Belgium (Dassonneville and Hooghe 2012; Hooghe and Dassonneville 2012) and in 
local elections more specifically (Vermeir and Heyndels 2006). 
 
Belgium is divided into 589 municipalities, 308 of which are in Flanders and 262 in Wallonia. 
The remaining 19 municipalities are part of the Brussels-Capital Region. Every six years, 
Belgian voters go to the polling booth to choose a local parliament. Belgian municipalities are 
governed by a mayor and a college of aldermen, who can either be of one or of multiple 
parties having a majority of the seats in the local parliament. As holds for elections at higher 
levels of governance, municipal elections are characterized by a system of compulsory voting 
and Belgian citizens over 18 years old are required to go to the polling booth (Deschouwer 
2012). Despite the fact that compulsory voting in Belgium is not strictly enforced, turnout 
levels are generally quite high. With 90% turnout in the 2012 local elections, absenteeism was 
at a record high level for local elections in Belgium (Marien et al. 2015). 
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Within the Belgian electoral system, votes are translated into seats proportionally, which is 
one of the reasons for a high level of fragmentation of the Belgian party system (De Winter, 
Swyngedouw and Dumont 2006). This fragmented political landscape is reflected at the local 
level as well, where besides national lists there are multiple local or semi- local lists running 
for election (Ackaert, Reynaert and Van Aelst 2007). Furthermore, this presence of local lists 
has remained quite strong over time, countering arguments of a nationalization of local 
politics (Wille and Deschouwer 2007). As a result, the heterogeneity in local politics is quite 
high, with different and unique choice sets of parties taking part in the election in each 
Belgian municipality. 
 
Local elections in Belgium should not simply be defined as second-order elections. Instead, 
local elections appear to be taking a middle position in between, on the one hand, the federal 
and regional elections (that are first order) and, on the other hand, European Parliament 
elections (that are of second order) (Deschouwer 2012; Marien et al. 2015). Despite their 
subordinate position as opposed to federal or regional elections, they do matter to both parties 
and voters (Hooghe et al. 2010; Vermeir and Heyndels 2006). The competences of the 
municipalities encompass fields as housing, education, public order and social policy. These 
areas of activity really matter to citizens and are highly visible as well (Deschouwer 2012). 
Consequently, the local level elections in Belgium can be an excellent case for investigating 
mechanisms of accountability, because at a local level it is much clearer to voters what 
incumbents actually deliver.  
 
The local elections of 14 October 2012 received substantial media coverage and the stakes 
were perceived as being very high. Since the previous local elections of 2006 the balance of 
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power in the Belgian electoral space has altered substantially. On the Flemish side the N-VA 
(New Flemish Alliance), no longer running in an electoral alliance with the Christian 
Democrats, won the 2010 federal elections (Abts, Poznyak and Swyngedouw 2012). The 
party was eager to confirm its position as a major political party at the local level as well. 
During the 2012 local election campaign, the N-VA tried to make the policies of the federal 
government and the position of the Francophone prime minister Di Rupo the main issue of the 
election by framing the local elections in national terms.  
 
Changes have been less fundamental in the Francophone electoral space, but here as well the 
local elections were perceived as an important test for the federal government and more 
specifically for the PS (Socialist Party, the party of the prime minister). This framing of the 
local elections as a referendum about the national incumbent coalition can be thought to have 
further obfuscated mechanisms of accountability at the local level. As a result, the 2012 local 
elections can be considered a hard test for theories of economic voting at a local level. In the 
Flemish region, the N-VA can be considered the main winner of the 2012 local elections. The 
traditional parties Christian-Democrats, Social Democrats and Liberals on the other hand, 
faced important losses. The PS remained the largest party in the Walloon region, although 
liberals and greens gained votes as well. In the Brussels-Capital Region, no major electoral 
shifts occurred on 14 October 2012 (Dassonneville et al. 2013). 
 
3. Economic voting  
 
The economic voter hypothesis is without any doubt one of the most influential theories in 
voting behaviour research (for a literature review see Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000). 
Having its origins in the work of Key (1966), the theory assumes that individual voters and 
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the electorate at large hold incumbents accountable for the economy by means of a reward-
and-punishment mechanism. Voters are assumed to be more likely to vote for the incumbent 
party when the economy prospers and to be less likely to vote for the incumbent in a context 
of economic downturn.  
 
Research on economic voting originated in the United States, but by now, numerous 
aggregate- as well as individual- level analyses have shown economic voting mechanisms to 
be present in a wide range of democracies and in multiparty systems as well (Dassonneville 
and Lewis-Beck 2014b; Duch and Stevenson 2008; van der Brug et al. 2007). The assessment 
of the profound impact of the economy world-wide has led Lewis-Beck and Whitten (2013, 
395) to conclude that the economy is “a central variable in any voting behaviour model”.  
 
The insight that the electorate’s perception of the economic situation in a country is often 
based on ‘local’ impressions is not regularly taken into account in studies on economic 
voting. The literature on economic voting predominantly focuses on national electoral 
contexts. Obviously, an important reason for the lack of attention to non-national contexts is a 
lack of clarity. As Fauvelle-Aymar and Lewis-Beck (2011, 369) specify: “Classical economic 
voting theory becomes complicated when applied to second-order elections, because there are 
two incumbents (…) and two economies”. In recent years, however, a fair number of studies 
on economic voting have given specific attention to either the subnational (Auberger and 
Dubois 2011; Cutler 2002; Fauvelle-Aymar and Lewis-Beck 2011; Gélineau and Bélanger 
2005; Jérôme and Jérôme-Speziari 2005; Jérôme and Lewis-Beck 1999; Johnston and Pattie 
2001; Johnston et al. 2000) or the international (Fernández-Albertos 2006) context on the 
national vote.  
 
 8 
In studies that look at economic voting in local contexts two main approaches for assessing 
the economic vote can be distinguished. A first strand of research follo ws the second-order 
election theory (Reif and Schmitt 1980) and considers local elections as referenda for 
national- level politics. It is this line of research that shows that voters react to national 
economic conditions and credit or blame parties in national office through local or 
subnational ballots (Auberger and Dubois 2011; Fauvelle-Aymar and Lewis-Beck 2011; 
Gélineau and Bélanger 2005; Jérôme and Jérôme-Speziari 2005; Jérôme and Lewis-Beck 
1999; Martins and Veiga 2013). A second group of scholars argues that local economic 
conditions affect voting behaviour in national electoral contexts (Cutler 2002; Johnston and 
Pattie 2001; Johnston et al. 2000). With scholars investigating the effect of the national 
economy on local elections and scholars assessing how local economic conditions affect the 
vote in national elections, a gap in the literature emerges. Remarkably little attention has been 
given to the question to what extent local economic conditions affect vote choices in local 
elections.  
 
Some recent studies have started to address this missing link, investigating whether local 
incumbents are held accountable for local economic conditions as well. Two main theoretical 
frameworks are the basis of these studies. On the one hand, a number of publications are 
inspired by the political business cycle literature, where it has been shown that local 
incumbents strategically increase spending or reduce the tax burden when approaching 
Election Day (Blais and Nadeau 1992; Foucault and François 2005; Sakurai and Menezes-
Filho 2011; Veiga and Veiga 2007). Building further on such observations, there are 
investigations on whether these strategies are having an impact on voters’ electoral decisions 
(Sakurai and Menezes-Filho 2008; Vermeir and Heyndels 2006). According to this line of 
research, voters opportunistically re-elect parties spending higher budgets on services, or 
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lowering taxes. Hence, the focus here is on what economic policies are implemented and how 
these affect voters’ decisions on Election Day. Such a focus has been claimed to be 
particularly relevant at lower levels of government, where the policies that are implemented 
are highly relevant for and quickly visible to citizens (Blais and Nadeau 1992). On the other 
hand, the classic economic voting theorem of incumbents being held accountable for the ir 
performance is argued to be relevant at a local level as well. The assumption of this 
perspective is that voters take into account the state of the economy, i.e. economic outcomes 
and not merely specific benefits, when casting their vote on Election Day. This is evident 
from recent research showing that local incumbents as well are held accountable for how they 
performed while being in office, with their performances operationalized by means of 
indicators of local economic conditions (Berry and Howell 2007; Boyne et al. 2009; Oliver 
and Ha 2007).  
 
Research in this field is accumulating slowly and most studies are at an aggregate level, 
investigating the impact of the economy on incumbents’ vote share or their chances for re-
election only. Aggregate- level research is however subject to ecological fallacy, which is why 
Oliver and Ha (2011) conduct an analysis of voting at the individual level. Their analysis, 
however, is subject to another important limitation, as they rely on individuals’ subjective 
assessment of the state of the economy. Such measures, even though useful, are also criticized 
for not being exogenous (Stevenson and Duch 2013).  In the current paper we contribute to 
this emerging line of research by presenting an analysis of the impact of objective local 
economic indicators on individual vote choice in local elections, hence overcoming both 
limitations. 
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Very little research has investigated the direct link between local econo mic conditions and 
voting in local elections. Despite this lack of empirical evidence, we assume that the general 
economic voter theory applies to local contexts as well and that voters rely on their 
assessment of the local economy to reward and punish local incumbents. We hence have 
grounds to believe that the local economic context affected voting behaviour in the 2012 
Belgian municipal elections. Consequently, we hypothesize: 
 
Hypothesis 1: The better the state of the economy in a municipality, the more likely a voter is 
to vote for the local incumbent.  
 
It can be argued that local incumbents have little impact on the state of the economy in their 
municipality. They have, however, a control over the local budget and they can use this 
control to increase spending or to reduce taxes. Such policy choices, which have previously 
been found to be implemented especially near the end of an electoral cycle (Blais and Nadeau 
1992; Foucault and François 2005; Veiga and Veiga 2007), should signal the incumbent’s 
competence in managing the economy. Assuming that voters are observing such signals (e.g. 
lowering taxes and /or spending on public services) in their home area, this should increase 
the probability of voting for the incumbent. 
 
Hypothesis 2: The more incumbents invest in local economy, the more likely a voter is to vote 
for the incumbent. 
 
The Belgian political landscape is highly fragmented (De Winter et al. 2006) and it is hence 
not surprising that this requires the formation of governing coalitions (Deschouwer 2012). At 
the local level as well, parties regularly form coalitions – even in addition to the ubiquitous 
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pre-electoral cartels. In a context where coalitions of parties govern and implement policies, 
the clarity of responsibility can be argued to be lower (Powel and Whitten 1993; Nadeau, 
Niemi, and Yoshinaka 2002). Previous research, however, has shown that in such contexts the 
electorate tends to identify some parties in particular and hold them accountable for the 
economy (Anderson 2000; Debus, Stegmaier, and Tosun 2014). In the context of Belgian 
local politics, we can assume the list of the mayor takes on his role. Decisions at a local level 
are taken collegially by the college of mayor and aldermen, but it is evident that the mayor is 
the primus inter pares within the executive (Deschouwer 2012). This role also comes with a 
high visibility for the mayor, with substantial attention from local media (Rodenbach et al. 
2015). Consequently, we expect that our hypotheses on the economic vote will hold for a vote 
for the list of the incumbent mayor as well (H3 and H4) and in line with the findings of Debus 
et al. (2014) on the role of the chancellor in Germany, we even expect this effect to be 
stronger for the list of the incumbent mayor than what holds for a vote for the incumbent 
coalition in general. 
 
Hypothesis 3: The better the state of the economy in a municipality, the more likely a voter is 
to vote for the list of the incumbent mayor.  
 
Hypothesis 4: The more incumbents invest in local economy, the more likely a voter is to vote 
for the list of the incumbent mayor. 
 
While economic voting is mostly investigated in general terms, a growing number of studies 
draws attention to substantial individual- level heterogeneity in the economic vote (de Vries 
and Giger 2014; Duch 2001; Gomez and Wilson 2001, 2006). A prime factor looked at in this 
regard is political sophistication, and it is assumed and found that high sophisticates are better 
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able to connect the state of the economy to incumbents’ performances – as this is a 
cognitively demanding task. Economic voting at a local level in particular can be assumed to 
be highly demanding as well – all the more so as previous work has indicated that unlike low 
sophisticated voters, the high politically sophisticated “look beyond simple attributions, 
constructing more complex causal stories” (Gomez and Wilson 2006: 132). While it should 
not be too hard to credit or blame the national incumbent for the state of the national 
economy, the story is more complex when it comes to local economic conditions. Especially 
high politically sophisticates can therefore be thought to take into account the role played by 
different governmental actors, including local incumbents as well. Therefore, we hypothesize 
that the local economic vote will be stronger among high sophisticates than what holds for 
low politically sophisticated voters. 
 
Hypothesis 5: Higher levels of political sophistication strengthen the local economic vote. 
 
4. Data and method 
 
4.1. Data 
For investigating the hypotheses, we make use of the data from the PartiRep exit poll 2012. 
This exit poll survey was conducted at the occasion of the 2012 local elections. The exit poll 
format implies that voters were interviewed immediately after leaving the polling station. The 
main advantage of this survey method is that a bias due to recall errors and flawed memories 
is minimized. In order to conduct a nationally representative survey in the context of 
municipal elections, the sample design consisted of a three-step procedure. First, 40 of the 
589 municipalities in Belgium were randomly selected within regionally based socio-
economic clusters. By doing so, sufficient variation was ensured with regard to region 
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(Flanders, Wallonia and the capital Brussels) as well as the socio-economic composition of 
Belgian municipalities. Subsequently, polling stations were randomly selected in each of the 
municipalities in the sample, and the number of stations covered in a municipality was in 
proportion to its number of inhabitants. As a final step, interviewers had to invite each fifth 
voter leaving the polling station to participate in the exit poll survey.1 Fieldwork resulted in a 
dataset of 4,591 randomly selected respondents.  The overall response rate for the survey was 
37.9%, in line with what can be expected for this specific survey format (Dassonneville, 
Marien and Hooghe 2012). 
 
4.2. Method 
The nested structure of the exit poll dataset (individuals grouped in municipals) makes it 
possible to approach the data in a hierarchical multilevel way. Moreover, the interest of this 
paper is not primarily on the effect of the individual level indicators on voting for the 
incumbent, but on the municipal economic effects and on how contextual factors interact with 
individual- level determinants of voting behaviour. The preferred analysis method is, 
therefore, multilevel regression analysis (Hox 2010).  
 
4.3. Variables included in the analyses 
The central dependent variable is incumbency voting; therefore, a variable was constructed 
taking the value of 1 if a respondent reported to have voted for one of the parties of the 
incumbent local coalition and 0 otherwise. 2  Even though we are investigating economic 
                                                 
1. Interviewers were at their assigned polling station for the full period polling stations were 
open. This implies they were interviewing from 8am to 1pm where paper ballots where used, 
to 3pm where votes were cast electronically and to 4pm in municipalities in the Brussels 
capital region. 
2 . In the case of changing electoral alliances, as soon as one party that is part of an electoral 
alliance was in the ruling local coalition (having at least one alderman), this list was 
considered an ‘incumbent’ list. 
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voting in a multiparty context, we restrict the analyses to investigating this binary dependent 
variable. We cannot make use of multinomial modelling techniques, because of data and 
interpretation limitations. (The data cover elections in 40 different municipalities, with large 
variations in the choice sets on offer in each of these municipalities, and variations in the 
extent to which pre-electoral coalitions took part in these local elections. As a consequence, a 
multinomial analysis yields results that are mostly poorly identified and uninterpretable, e.g., 
– with 90 different outcome categories of which each respondent on average only had four on 
the ballot.) Given these limitations, we thus test the economic voter theory in its simplest 
form; i.e., distinguishing between a vote for the incumbent and a vote for an opposition party. 
Previous research taking such an approach in multiparty contexts has already given strong 
indications of that the mechanics of economic voting are working (see e.g., Nadeau, Lewis-
Beck and Bélanger 2013). Self-evidently, for examining the impact of economic indicators of 
voting for the list of the incumbent mayor as well, the dependent variable is binary and takes 
the value of 1 if a respondent reported to have voted for the incumbent mayor’s list and 0 
otherwise. 
 
Our first main independent variable captures state of the local economy. While the value of 
subjective economic perceptions for investigating the economic vote has been the subject of 
considerable debate (Stevenson and Duch 2013; van der Eijk et al. 2007), objective indicators 
have repeatedly been found to not only be reflected in subjective perceptions of the economy 
(Sanders 2000), but also to be good predictors of voting for the incumbent (Kiewiet and Udell 
1998; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2013). We hence include an objective measure of the 
economy in our analyses. Within the literature on economic voting, a number of different 
indicators are regularly used to tap the state of the economy, of which GDP growth and 
unemployment can be considered ‘the big two’ (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2013: 376). Given 
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that data on economic growth are not available at a subnational level, we rely on 
unemployment as the indicator of how the local economy is performing. We thus look at 
change in unemployment rates in each of the 40 municipalities in the sample. Research 
indicates that voters do not react to short-term economic fluctuations immediately prior to 
Election Day. Furthermore voters tend not to take into account the economy over a full 
electoral cycle but only the more recent period (Wlezien 2015). Taking these elements into 
account, we look at change in unemployment rates between 2010 and 2011, and how this 
affects voting for the incumbent coalition. 
 
Our second hypothesis relates to the impact of incumbent local economic policy on the 
probability of voting for the incumbent. Previous research has investigated the impact of these 
choices – usually within the framework of political business cycles – by means of data on 
municipal spending, as well as by means of data on local tax rates. As data on expenditures 
over the electoral term are not available, we rely on tax rate measures only. In line with 
Vermeir and Heyndels (2006), we focus on the two most important municipal taxes; the local 
income tax and the local property tax. Both taxes are surcharges to taxes at other levels of 
governance, and the local property tax is more easily identified as a real local tax by the 
citizens (Vermeir and Heyndels 2006). As tax rates are highly stable over the course of the 
electoral cycle, we do not investigate the impact of changes in tax rates but instead include 
actual tax rate levels in the analyses.  
 
Self-evidently, we add a number of controls. At the individual level, we include traditional 
socio-demographics such as respondent age, gender and whether or not they have a higher 
education degree. Furthermore, we control for the voter language group – French or Dutch – 
that serves as a proxy for the political system in which voters take part (Brack and Pilet 2010). 
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As a measure of ideology, we add voter self-placement on a 0-to-10 left-right scale. 
Furthermore, because we assume the extent to which voters are ‘embedded’ in their local 
communities will affect their likelihood of local incumbent voting, we control for the number 
of years a respondent has been living in his or her municipality. To check if high sophisticates 
are better able to connect the state of the economy to incumbents’ performances  we have to 
include a political sophistication indicator in the analyses. The best single indicator to 
operationalize political sophistication is probably political knowledge (Lachat 2007 ; 
Marthaler 2008), but the exit poll format did not allow including a battery of knowledge 
questions in the questionnaires. As an alternative, we focus on the mediating impact of levels 
of education, which is a regularly used – although imperfect – indicator of political 
sophistication (for a discussion on different ways of operationalizing sophistication, see 
Lachat 2007). We thus expect the general effects of economic indicators on the probability of 
a vote for the incumbent to be strengthened among the high educated. 
 
Additionally, at the level of municipalities, we control for the number of terms the party of the 
mayor has been in office.3 Doing so, we control for the occurrence of a ‘cost of ruling’-effect 
(Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2013). We also include the effective number of parties4 at the 
local level, to take into account the fact that with fewer alternatives available, the probability 
of voting for the incumbent coalition increases. The 40 municipalities in our sample vary 
considerably, not only with respect to the type of parties and number of parties playing a role 
in local elections, but also with respect to the strength of incumbent coalitions. On average, 
the ruling incumbent coalition obtained a combined vote share of 59% of the votes, but this 
                                                 
3. With a maximum of six terms, which dates back to 1976, when there were major mergers of 
municipalities.   
4. The effective number of electoral parties  (ENEP) is calculated, applying the Laakso and 
Taagepera-formula to the election results of the 2006 Belgian municipal elections (Laakso 
and Taagepera 1979).  
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varies from 46% of the votes to 90% of the votes. This variation in the electoral strength of 
local incumbents is likely to have an impact on the probability that voters choose an 
incumbent party in 2012 as well. Therefore, in the analyses we control for the combined vote 
share that the incumbent parties obtained in 2006 – which is a municipal- level variable added 
to the model.5 For the analyses explaining voting for the list of the incumbent mayor only, the 
vote share this party only obtained in the 2006 elections is controlled for. Descriptive 
statistics of all independent variables are listed in Appendix 1. 
 
5. Results 
 
Before investigating the determinants of voting for the local incumbent, and the impact of the 
economy on the vote choice, it is worth mentioning that there is quite some variation in 
incumbency voting in the sample. Of the 3,892 respondents included in the analyses, 54.73% 
voted for an incumbent list, while 45.27% did not. The main question we focus upon, is to 
what extent the vote choices of this 54.73% of the respondents supporting local incumbents 
can be interpreted as a ‘reward’ for how well the local economy is performing , or for the 
economic policies implemented by the incumbent. 
 
The results of the multilevel analyses explaining incumbent voting are presented in Table 1. 
As a first step, we estimated an intercept only model, which allows us to assess the total 
amount of variance at the level of municipalities. The ρ-coefficient for this null-model is 
0.197, implying that almost 20% of the variance in incumbent voting situated itself at the 
level of municipalities. Consequently, we conclude that it does make sense to look at factors 
that are specific to municipalities to explain incumbent voting in local elections.  
                                                 
5 . We thank one of the anonymous reviewers of this journal for this suggestion. 
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[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
In Model 1, we add the individual- and municipal- level control variables and we include the 
indicator for changes in unemployment rates between 2010 and 2011. Looking at the effects 
of the control variables first, voters with a college degree are significantly more likely to vote 
for an incumbent list compared to voters without a college degree. Furthermore, having lived 
in a municipality for a longer time significantly increases the probability of voting for an 
incumbent list. We note that the vote share the incumbent parties obtained in 2006 is a 
significant predictor of respondents’ likelihood of choosing an incumbent list in 2012. In 
addition, we included the number of terms an incumbent coalition has been in office, and the 
effective number of electoral parties as municipal- level controls in our models. Neither of 
these variables, however, reaches a conventional level of statistical significance.  
 
Now we turn to the independent variable of primary interest – unemployment. Changes in 
unemployment rates significantly affect the probability of voting for the local incumbent. The 
results indicate that the increasing unemployment rates meant voters were less likely to vote 
for a party of the ruling local coalition, statistically significant at 0.05.6  
 
The estimated effect of changes in unemployment rates on voting for an incumbent party is, 
furthermore, substantively significant, as is evident from the simulated predicted probabilities 
in Figure 1. These results suggest that – all other things equal – the probability that a citizen 
chooses a local incumbent is 67% when unemployment rates have decreased by two 
percentage points, this probability is reduced to 56% when unemployment rates have 
                                                 
6 . Note that, since our hypothesis is one-directional, with higher increases in unemployment 
rates expected to decrease the incumbent vote share, a one-tailed significance test is preferred. 
 19 
increased four percentage points and is reduced further to less than 45% in the extreme case 
of a 10 percentage point increase in unemployment rates. Consequently, we can conclude that 
there is strong evidence of local economic conditions affecting the probability that voters 
choose an incumbent party, with deteriorating economic conditions decreasing the probability 
that citizens vote for the incumbent.  
 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
It has previously been argued that because local incumbents have little control over macro-
economic indicators, it is not economic conditions but rather incumbent use of budgetary 
instruments that should affect citizens’ probability of voting for an incumbent list. Therefore, 
in Model 2 and Model 3, we assess the impact of local tax rates on the probability that 
respondents choose an incumbent list. The expectation is that higher tax rates decrease the 
probability of voting for an incumbent party. As evident from the results in Table 1, however, 
neither the local income tax rate (Model 2), nor the local property tax rate (Model 3) is 
significantly related to the probability that a voter has voted for one of the incumbent parties, 
in the context of the 2012 local elections.  
 
These null findings lead us to reject our second hypothesis. How incumbents use their fiscal 
tools – and at what level they set local tax rates – does not seem to be affecting the probability 
that voters vote for the local incumbent. Local economic conditions more generally, by 
contrast, are significantly affecting the probability that a citizen votes for an incumbent party 
list. Furthermore, it could be argued that not tax rates as such, but differences in tax rates from 
one municipality to another are affecting voter behaviour, in line with the findings of Vermeir 
and Heyndels (2006) who show mechanisms of yardstick voting. Therefore, we also 
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investigated the impact of deviations from the mean tax rates in our sample, with the 
expectation that incumbents are punished for levying higher than average tax rates. The 
results of these additional tests, however, do not indicate a significant impact of tax rates on 
choosing an incumbent party either.7 
 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
In line with previous research on economic voting in multiparty contexts (Debus et al. 2014) 
we expect that the head of the local coalition in particular – the mayor – will be held 
responsible for local economic conditions by the voters. In Table 2, we present the results of a 
series of multilevel logistic analyses examining the determinants of a vote for the list of the 
incumbent mayor. The model specification of the three models presented is identical to the 
main results included in the manuscript – except for the dependent variable, as we focus on 
voting for the list of the incumbent mayor only. The dependent variable hence takes the value 
of 1 if a respondent indicates to have voted for the list of the incumbent mayor and 0 
otherwise (regardless of whether one voted for an opposition party or for a member of the 
ruling coalition). Overall, 34% of our respondents did indicate to have voted for the list of the 
incumbent mayor. Obviously, the control for the vote share in the 2006 elections as well 
relates to the list of the incumbent mayor only. 
 
Looking at the results of the analyses in Table 2, contrary to H3 and H4, we note that none of 
the economic indicators seems to be significantly related (at .05) to casting a vote for the list 
of the incumbent mayor. For change in unemployment rates – the factor we found to be of 
relevance for casting an incumbent vote in general – the effect is in the expected direction 
                                                 
7 . Results not shown, but available from the authors upon request. 
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(negative), but statistically significant only at .10, not .05. It is somewhat puzzling to observe 
that we find the general effect of economic conditions on voting for the incumbent mayor to 
be weaker than for the incumbent coalition as a whole, especially as theoretically we expected 
this effect to be even stronger than the general effect. The results seem to suggest that – at a 
local level at least – Belgian voters identify the ruling coalition, and they distinguish less 
between parties that are more visible as an incumbent (i.e., the list of the mayor) and the other 
parties that are part of the ruling coalition. As the local level is much closer to the voter 
compared to higher levels of governance, perhaps voters are much better aware of what 
incumbent parties deliver – and of the fact that it is not only the party of the mayor that is 
(not) delivering. 
 
Finally, in Table 3, we present the results of our analyses investigating individual- level 
heterogeneity in the economic vote. We focus on the impact of political sophistication and 
add to the main models that were presented in Table 1 interaction terms between education 
(having a college degree) and our indicators of the state of the economy. As can be read from 
the table, we find a significant interaction effect – in the expected direction – for 
unemployment, but not for the other indicators.  
 
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The results hence suggest that the general relation we observed, that local incumbents are 
punished for worsening unemployment rates and rewarded for improving unemployment 
rates, is strengthened for voters with a college degree. This effect is visually illustrated in 
Figure 2, which shows the predicted probability of voting for the incumbent at different levels 
of Δ unemployment rate, for voters without and with a college degree separately. Clearly, 
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while for both groups of voters we observe the expected negative relationship – with strong 
increases in unemployment rates decreasing the probability of a vote for the local incumbent – 
this effect is weaker for voters without a college degree, compared to what holds for higher 
educated voters. These findings suggest that holding accountable local incumbents for the 
state of the local economy is a cognitively demanding task, that higher educated voters appear 
more capable of. 
 
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
6. Discussion 
 
Our aim has been to investigate whether economic voting is at play in local elections. We 
focused on the impact of local economic conditions and economic policies on voting in local 
elections, an approach other scholars have not regularly taken. Our analyses indicate that local 
economic conditions do seem to matter for the vote choice in local elections; increasing 
unemployment rates are associated with a significantly smaller probability of voting for the 
local incumbents. By establishing that the local economy has an impact on local vote choice, 
our results compliment research showing an impact of local economic conditions on national 
voting behaviour, or an impact of the national economy on sub-national vote choices. 
Through investigation this ‘local economy- local vote,’ we appear to have begun to fill in a 
“missing link” within the literature on economic voting.  
 
Looking at the impact economic conditions (measured as changes in unemployment rates), as 
compared to the impact of economic policies (measured as tax rates), we find that only the 
former significantly affect the probability of an incumbent party vote. The implication is that 
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citizens care about and pay attention to outcomes, not specific economic policies. Even at a 
local level, therefore, Fiorina’s claim that voters’ “primary emphasis [is] on policy outcomes 
rather than the means that lead to those outcomes” (Fiorina 1981: 194) seems valid. 
Accountability is generally considered an essential element for the well functioning of 
representative democracies (Przeworski, Stokes and Manin 1999).  Our results point out that, 
even at the local level, such accountability mechanisms are present – and it is not one local 
actor in particular but the local coalition as a whole that is held accountable for local 
economic conditions. One could wonder, however, whether it is fair that voters punish and 
reward their local incumbents for the state of the local economy – as local politicians have 
only a limited number of available instruments for influencing economic conditions. 
 
Overall, our results argue for the presence of economic voting at a local level in Belgium. 
This finding, in a highly fragmented electoral system, indicates the relevance of taking into 
account that the economy can affect voting behaviour at a local level as well. While we find a 
general effect of unemployment rates on voting for the local incumbent, this appears to be a 
cognitively quite demanding task – as for the higher educated in particular we observe the 
presence of economic voting at a local level. The appearance of this locally based 
accountability mechanism seems all the more surprising, given that, during the campaign, the 
election was strongly framed as a referendum on the national incumbent government, 
obscuring clarity of responsibility.  Focusing on how local economic conditions influence 
voting in local elections, we zoomed in on only one aspect of a more complex framework 
where different levels of governance can affect each other. Further research, therefore, should 
explicitly explore how politics and the economy on different levels of governance are 
intertwined. On a final note, including local public spending data, in models about the impact 
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of local level policy on incumbent voting, can further fine-tune analysis of the possible policy 
impact in local elections of the future. 
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TABLE 1. Multilevel binary logistic regression model explaining voting for an 
incumbent party 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 
b 
(s.e.) 
b 
(s.e.) 
b 
(s.e.) 
Individual level    
Age 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Female (ref: male) 0.062 0.061 0.061 
 (0.070) (0.070) (0.070) 
French (ref: Dutch) -0.250 -0.401** -0.451** 
 (0.196) (0.170) (0.167) 
College degree 0.131* 0.129* 0.131* 
 (0.071) (0.071) (0.071) 
Years living in municipality 0.006** 0.006** 0.006** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Left-right position 0.004 0.004 0.005 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Municipal level    
Incumbent vote share 2006 0.037** 0.039** 0.038** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Terms in office -0.002 -0.015 -0.029 
 (0.062) (0.062) (0.064) 
ENEP 0.256 0.261 0.264* 
 (0.157) (0.159) (0.160) 
Δ unemployment rate 2010-2011 -0.079*   
 (0.044)   
Local income tax  -0.154  
  (0.132)  
Local property tax   0.013 
   (0.021) 
Constant -2.756** -1.804 -3.276** 
 (1.054) (1.411) (1.238) 
N voters 3,892 3,892 3,892 
N municipalities 40 40 40 
σ2municipalities 0.465 0.481 0.484 
ρ 0.124 0.128 0.128 
Log likelihood -2,440.883 -2,441.810 -2,442.303 
Entries are unstandardized coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) of random intercept models. 
Significance levels (one-tailed tests): * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. ρ-value intercept-only model: 
0.197.  
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FIGURE 1. Estimated effect of change in unemployment rates (2010-2011) on 
probability to vote for an incumbent party 
 
Note: Mean probabilities and 90%-confidence intervals (one-tailed) of voting for an incumbent coalition for 
different levels of change in unemployment rates. Mean values from 10,000 simulated observations based on 
Model 1 in Table 1. 
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TABLE 2. Multilevel binary logistic regression model explaining voting for the 
incumbent mayor 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 
b 
(s.e.) 
b 
(s.e.) 
b 
(s.e.) 
Individual level    
Age -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Female (ref: male) 0.048 0.047 0.047 
 (0.070) (0.070) (0.070) 
French (ref: Dutch) 0.227 0.042 0.003 
 (0.199) (0.159) (0.150) 
College degree 0.065 0.064 0.067 
 (0.071) (0.071) (0.071) 
Years living in municipality 0.005* 0.005* 0.005* 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Left-right position -0.081*** -0.080*** -0.079*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Municipal level    
Incumbent mayor vote share 2006 0.014 0.014 0.014 
 (0.017) (0.018) (0.016) 
Terms in office 0.010 -0.001 -0.020 
 (0.051) (0.051) (0.049) 
ENEP -0.042 -0.040 -0.046 
 (0.217) (0.220) (0.207) 
Δ unemployment rate 2010-2011 -0.059+   
 (0.038)   
Local income tax  -0.037  
  (0.107)  
Local property tax   0.026* 
   (0.015) 
Constant -0.786 -0.493 -1.574 
 (1.391) (1.491) (1.426) 
N voters 3,892 3,892 3,892 
N municipalities 40 40 40 
σ2municipalities 0.278 0.282 0.249 
ρ 0.078 0.079 0.070 
Log likelihood -2,431.025 -2,432.183 -2,430.850 
Entries are unstandardized coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) of random intercept models. 
Significance levels (one-tailed tests):+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. ρ-value intercept-only 
model: 0.084.  
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TABLE 3. Multilevel binary logistic regression model explaining voting for an 
incumbent list – cross-level interactions 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 
b 
(s.e.) 
b 
(s.e.) 
b 
(s.e.) 
Individual level    
Age 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Female (ref: male) 0.067 0.063 0.064 
 (0.070) (0.070) (0.070) 
French (ref: Dutch) -0.249 -0.383* -0.436** 
 (0.197) (0.172) (0.168) 
College degree 0.230* -0.059 -0.079 
 (0.103) (0.767) (0.553) 
Years living in municipality 0.006** 0.006** 0.006** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Left-right position 0.003 0.003 0.004 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Municipal level    
Incumbent vote share 2006 0.038** 0.041** 0.040** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Terms in office 0.008 -0.002 -0.016 
 (0.063) (0.063) (0.065) 
ENEP 0.232 0.228 0.233 
 (0.161) (0.163) (0.164) 
Δ unemployment rate 2010-2011 -0.061+   
 (0.045)   
College degree x Δ unemployment -0.048*   
 (0.025)   
Local income tax  -0.174  
  (0.137)  
College degree x income tax  0.025  
  (0.102)  
Local property tax   0.010 
   (0.022) 
College degree x property tax   0.006 
   (0.016) 
Constant -2.814** -1.687 -3.199** 
 (1.073) (1.450) (1.274) 
N individuals 3,892 3,892 3,892 
N municipalities 40 40 40 
σ2municipalities 0.474 0.485 0.491 
σ2college degree 0.081 0.130 0.127 
ρ 0.144 0.157 0.158 
Log likelihood -2,436.207 -2,438.403 -2,439.002 
Entries are unstandardized coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) of random intercept models. 
Significance levels (one-tailed tests): ): + p < 0.10 , * * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.  
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FIGURE 2. Estimated effect of change in unemployment rates (2010-2011) on 
probability to vote for an incumbent party – the impact of having a college degree 
 
 
Note: Mean probabilities and 90%-confidence intervals (one-tailed) of voting for an incumbent coalition for 
different levels of change in unemployment rates. Mean values from 10,000 simulated observations based on 
Model 1 in Table 3. 
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APPENDIX 1. Descriptive statistics of independent variables 
 N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Age 3,892 44.65 16.88 18 95 
Female 3,892 0.48 0.50 0 1 
College degree 3,892 0.43 0.50 0 1 
French 3,892 0.42 0.50 0 1 
Left-right 3,892 4.78 2.22 0 10 
Years in municipality 3,892 23.70 18.96 0 90 
Incumbent vote share 2006 40 58.45 8.05 46.25 89.64 
Incumbent mayor vote share 
2006 
40 41.05 9,87 23.27 64.56 
Income per capita 40 16,072.05 2,879.95 8,242 22,840 
Δ unemployment rate 2010-2011 40 1.79 3.28 -1.05 9.06 
Δ unemployment rate 2006-2011 40 0.87 2.89 -2.93 7.14 
Local income tax 40 7.48 0.94 5.00 8.80 
Local property tax 40 33.52 5.98 18.75 43.75 
Terms in office 40 3.60 1.95 1 6 
ENEP 40 3.64 0.77 1.85 5.18 
 
